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Fighting corruption in Africa: do existing corruption-control levels matter? 
 
Abstract
Purpose –   Are  there  different  determinants  in  the  fight  against  corruption  across  African 
countries? Why are some countries more effective at battling corruption than others? To assess 
these concerns we  examine the determinants of corruption-control throughout the conditional 
distribution of the fight against corruption using panel data from 46 African countries for the 
period 2002-2010. 
Design/methodology/approach –  The  panel  quantile  regression  technique  enables  us  to 
investigate  if the relationship between corruption-control and the exogenous variables differs 
throughout the distribution of the fight against corruption. 
Findings –  Results  could be summarized in the following. (1) Greater economic prosperity 
leads to less corruption-control and the magnitude of the effect is more important in countries 
where  the  fight  against  corruption  is  high.  (2)  Regulation  quality  seems  bimodal,  with  less 
positive effects in the tails: among the best and least fighters of corruption. (3) There is  support 
for a  less negative consequence of population growth in countries that are already taking the 
fight against corruption seriously in comparison to those that are lax on the issue. (4) Findings on 
democracy broadly indicate the democratization process increases the fight against corruption 
with a greater magnitude at higher quantiles: countries that are already taking the fight seriously. 
(5)  The  relevance  of  voice  and  accountability  in  the  battle  against  corruption  decreases  as 
corruption-control  is  taking  more  seriously  by  the  powers  that  be.  (6)  Good  governance 
dynamics  of  political  stability,  government  effectiveness  and  the  rule  of  law  gain  more 
importance in the fight against corruption when existing levels of corruption-control are already 
high.
Social implications –  Our results suggest that the determinants of corruption-control respond 
differently  across  the  corruption-control  distribution.  This  implies  some  current  corruption-
control  policies  may  be  reconsidered,  especially  among  the  most  corrupt  and  least  corrupt 
African nations. As a policy implication, the fight against corruption should not be postponed, 
doing so will only reduce the effectiveness of policies in the future. The rewards of institutional 
reforms are more positive in countries that are already seriously engaged in the corruption fight.
 
Originality/value –  This  paper  contributes  to  existing  literature  on  the  determinants  of 
corruption by focusing on the distribution of the dependent variable(control of corruption). It is 
likely that good and poor corruption fighters respond differently to factors that influence the 
fight  against  corruption.  There are  subtle  institutional  differences  between corrupt  and clean 
nations that  may affect  corruption-control  determinants  and government  efficacy in  the fight 
against corruption.
JEL Classification: C10; H10; K10; O10; O55
Keywords:  Corruption; Democracy; Government quality; Quantile regression; Africa
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1. Introduction
Over the past decades, the issue of corruption and the search for strategies to combat its 
corrosive effects have grown in importance as a topic of public debate and a criterion by which 
the civil  society evaluates leadership. This increased attention is motivated by the realization 
among  international  development  experts  that  development  requires  above  all  governance 
quality. Advice on sound policies, well intentioned incentives and aid efforts may not achieve 
their desired objective unless they are offered in an environment that stimulates self-sustaining 
growth  and  development(Jain,2001).  There  is  also  mounting  realization  that  unsustainable 
policies do not always emerge from a lack of knowledge about what best policies should be. 
Rather they could result just as much from decision makers distorting economic policies for their 
own interest(Coolidge & Rose-Ackerman, 1997; Grossman & Helpman, 1994; Krueger 1993a; 
Krueger  1993b).  Corruption  is  seen  by  many  as  one  of  the  principal  impediments  to  the 
development  of  an  efficient  government  system;  since  it  is  conceived  as  a  “symptom  that  
something has gone wrong in the management of the state”(Rose-Ackeman,1999, p.9).  Even the 
public acknowledges at large that corruption is the greatest obstacle to economic development 
(Jain,  2001).  There  is  currently  a  stream  of  empirical  investigations  on  the  causes  and 
consequences of corruption. Though some consensus is slowly emerging on the determinants of 
corruption across countries, a number of aspects remain unsolved. There is lack of consensus on 
the ability to measure corrupt activity and the difficulty of quantifying the impact of institutions 
on controlling corruption(Billger &  Goel, 2009). The focus of this paper is the later concern. 
Today  policies  in  the  fight  against  corruption  espoused  by  national  governments  and 
international organizations appear to be similar across  countries. Yet the effectiveness of some 
of these policies remain unclear(Billger & Goel, 2009).  
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The contribution of this  paper to the literature is its  focus on  the distribution of the 
dependent variable(i.e. control of corruption). Corruption-control determinants and governments’ 
efficacy in combating corruption maybe different across countries such that corrupt and ‘clean’ 
countries respond differently to factors that ignite the fight against corruption. This hypothesis 
begs the question of whether there are different determinants of combating corruption in high 
corruption-control countries as compared to low corruption-control ones.  Thus if existing levels 
of corruption-control affect how various motives for the fight against  corruption come  into 
play, then findings of this paper could have significant implications both for the literature and 
policy making toward the battle against corrupt practices in Africa.  It follows that instead of 
focusing on groups of countries with common corruption-control measures, policy could instead 
target groups of countries with the same corruption-control characteristics(high, low or average). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews existing literature. Data 
and methodology are presented and outlined  respectively in  Section 3.  Empirical  analysis  is 
covered in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Existing literature
2.1 Theoretical highlights
According to  Jain(2001),  corruption  requires  three  preconditions:  discretionary  power 
related  to  regulations(also  see  Rose-Ackeman,  1978),  economic  rents  linked  to  power  and 
sufficiently marginal punishment(Dong et al.,2012). These are the results of four main theories 
of corruption. (1) Good and misguided governments formulate systems that are very rigid. Venal 
bureaucrats shape the rules. Corruption diminishes red-tape and if anything improves allocation 
efficiency(Leff, 1964; Huntington, 1968). (2) Good and smart governments plan systems that are 
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supposed  to  be  rigid.  Venal  bureaucrats  bend  the  rules  and  regulations.  Corruption  reduces 
bureaucracy and worsens allocation efficiency(Laffont & Tirole, 1993).  (3) Greedy and smart 
governments make rules that are very lax and allow bureaucrats more discretion than they should 
have. There is absence of red-tape and no need for any corruption. Allocation efficiency suffers a 
great deal(Shleifer & Vishny,1993). (4) Good and smart governments establish rules that make 
it tempting for the bureaucrat to take money and bend the rules. The bureaucrat introduces red-
tape in a bid to bend the rules in a way that protects him/her. Corruption and red-tape go hand in 
glove. 
According to Billger &  Goel (2009), the theoretical foundations for corruption studies 
also  draw from the  larger  literature  on the  determinants  of  criminal  activity,  where  rational 
individuals(bribe-givers,  bribe-takers  …etc)  weigh  the  relative  costs  and  benefits  of 
criminal(corrupt)  acts(Becker,  1968).  Potential  benefits  of  corruption  could  include 
disproportionate favors that monopolist bureaucrats maybe able to hand-out(Shleifer & Vishny, 
1993)  or  they  may  involve  cutting(accelerating)  bureaucratic  red-tape(Guriev,  2004).  The 
differential  levels  of  impatience(discount  rates)  across  economic  agents  induce  some  to 
accept/offer  bribes  and dictate  the  size  of  the bribes.  Potential  costs  of  engaging in  corrupt 
endeavors include the cost of apprehension and punishment. Surviving literature does however 
allow for the possibility that monitoring agencies might themselves be corrupt(Banerjee, 1997). 
2.2 Types and levels of corruption: how the stakes involved can influence governance
Given the  context  of  this  paper,  it  is  irrelevant  to  center  the  debate  on  the  issue  of 
whether  corruption is  inherently good or bad. It  is  more useful to determine which types  of 
corruption have the most corrosive effect on social/economic stability(development).  Political 
leadership play a crucial role in promoting/discouraging corrupt activities. To effectively shape 
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this role, it is imperative to move beyond the subjective and qualitative analyses that describe 
corruption as a mere moral failing of politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen. Thus it is more 
useful to consider it as a political and economic phenomenon. 
Corruption is prevalent to some degree in all societies. In recent years however political 
scientists  have  aggressively  sought  to  understand the  reason some  nations  and  societies  are 
clearly more vulnerable to abusive political and economic opportunism than others. In response 
they have suggested a number of typologies that indicate linkages between the incidences of 
corruption and specific stages of political, economic and social developments (Kpundeh,1998). 
According to  some authors,  the types  and amounts  of corruption  vary in  accordance  with a 
number  of  factors  affecting  the  relationship  between government  and civil  society(Johnston, 
1982). For the purpose of explicitly stating the objective of our study, it is useful to categorize  
the  phenomenon  into  three  frameworks:  incidental,  systematic  and  systemic  corruption  as 
summarized  in  Table  1(consistent  with   Kpundeh(1998)).  Firstly,   Incidental  corruption   is 
characterized by petty bribery and involves opportunistic individuals or small  groups. In this 
context,  corruption is the exception rather than the rule. High-level private sector actors and 
senior officials seldom bother with such theft. Secondly, Systematic corruption is organized, not 
necessarily institutionalized or pervasive but recurrent. It usually involves large gains which are 
often subject to popular scandals. While it is entrenched and functions with a large number of 
officials, intermediaries and entrepreneurs, this form of corruption originates from  high-level 
civil  servants that recognize and exploit the illegal ventures and opportunities in government 
departments and agencies. Hence, this practice is the direct violation of the rule of law. Thirdly, 
Systemic  corruption  is  pervasive,  institutionalized(perhaps  accepted  but  not  necessarily 
approved),  and built  into  the  economic  and political  institutions.  It  occurs  and flourishes  in 
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situations  where  public  sector  wages  fall  below  a   living-wage.  In  contrast  to  systematic 
corruption, it involves all levels of employment.
Table 1: A Simplified Typology of Corruption
Type Main Actors Mode
Incidental 
Petty officials, interested 
officials and opportunistic 
individuals. 
Small size embezzlement and misappropriation, 
bribes, favoritism and discrimination. 
Systematic 
Public officials, politicians, 
representatives of donor and 
recipient countries, 
bureaucratic elites, business 
men and middle men.
Bribery and kickbacks, collusion to defraud the 
public, large-scale embezzlement and 
misappropriation through public tender and 
disposal of public property, economic privileges 
accorded to special interests, large political 
donations and bribes. 
Systemic 
Bureaucratic elites, politicians, 
business men and white-collar 
workers. 
Large-scale embezzlement through ‘ghost 
worker’ on government pay roll, embezzling 
government funds through false procurement-
payment for nonexistent goods, large scale 
disbursement of public property to special and 
privileged interest under the pretext of ‘national 
interest’, favoritism and discrimination exercised 
in favor of ruling parties in exchange for political 
contributions. 
Source: Kpundeh(1998)
Thus  from  a  theoretical  standpoint  the  fight  against  corruption  could  be  incidental, 
systematic or systemic. However from a practical standpoint legislation against corruption often 
encompasses the three types. Our paper focuses indifferently on the three types of corruption. 
This  is  because where there is  systemic  corruption,  systematic  and incidental  corruption are 
already prevalent; which is the case of most African countries. 
2.3 Governance and fight against corruption in Africa
An intense debate has raged on for years over Africa’s economic woes. Aside from the 
obvious  problems  of  warfare,  drought  and  disease,  the  usual  suspect  is  economic 
policy(Coolidge & Rose-Ackerman, 1997). Corruption remains the most daunting challenge for 
majority  of   African  countries.  As  evidenced  by several  studies  and  surveys,  it  is  a  major 
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obstacle  to  economic  progress,  social  welfare,  service  delivery  and good governance  in  the 
continent.  According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa(UNECA,2009, 
p.1),  it  is  estimated  that  in  2004,  the  continent  lost  more  than  $148  billion  to  corruption; 
approximately 25% of its Gross Domestic Product(GDP). In addition, the African Development 
Bank(ADB,2006, p.7) suggests that 50% of tax revenue and $30 billion in aid for Africa ends up 
in corrupt hands. According to the UNECA(2005), corruption ranked as one of the three most 
serious  national   problems  confronting  African  countries,  the  other  two  being  poverty  and 
unemployment. In the 2009 African Governance Report, corruption seems to have worsened in 
many Africa countries  (UNECA, 2009).  Most  governance  institutions:  executive,  legislative, 
judiciary  and  public  service  are  considered  to  be  corrupt.  In  line  with  the  report,  poor 
governance,  lack  of  accountability  and  transparency,  low  level  of  democratic  culture  and 
tradition, deficiency in citizen participation, lack of clear regulations, low level of institutional 
control, extreme poverty and inequality could be cited as major causes of corruption. Even civil 
society is not immune to the scourge. More so, a blurred distinction between private and public 
interests, inadequate accounting and auditing, over regulated bureaucracy and deterioration of 
acceptable moral standards are all part of the problem. 
Many African  countries  have  adopted  policy measures,  enacted  laws and established 
institutions in a bid to address the issue. Yet corruption continues to be a lingering concern in 
governance and economic life.  In this  paper we attempt to explain determinants in the fight 
against  corruption.  Its  contribution  to  the  literature  is  threefold.  (1)  By  focusing  on  the 
distribution  of  the  dependent  variable,  we  assess  if  corrupt  and  ‘clean’  countries  respond 
differently to factors that deter corrupt activity.  Unlike mainstream literature,  we are able to 
provide an assessment of corruption-control conditional on the distribution of corruption-control. 
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(2) A corollary of the first contribution is that, countries manifesting the same existing levels of 
corruption-control could be provided with similar policy-options; thus making policy-measures 
more targeted and compatible with the conditional distribution of corruption-control. (3) The use 
of much recent data(2002-2010) based on majority(46) of African countries provides results with 
inclusive and updated policy implications. 
Given both the inability of measuring the true level  of corruption and the substantial 
effort required in creating another index(which could be no better than existing indices), two 
research avenues have been proposed(Billger &  Goel, 2009).  The first consists of examining 
additional  determinants of corruption (Treisman, 2000) while the second involves employing 
different estimation techniques(McAdam & Rummel, 2004). The later strategy is the focus of 
this  paper.  This approach enables us to capture the subtle differences in the determinants  of 
corruption-control  across  ‘clean’  and  ‘dirty’  countries.  Thus  an  assessment  throughout  the 
conditional distribution of the fight against corruption could substantially add to the extant body 
of knowledge in the corruption-development nexus. 
3.Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data
We  assess  a  panel  of  46  countries  with  updated  data(2002-2010)  from  African 
Development Indicators(ADI) of the World Bank(WB). The dependent variable is the ‘control of 
corruption’ indicator;  consistent with the corruption literature(Billger &  Goel,2009; Okada & 
Samreth,2012; Asongu,2012). In this study we use eight control variables: level of economic 
prosperity,  population  growth,  democracy,  regulation  quality,  political  stability,  government 
effectiveness, voice & accountability and rule of law. These variables have been used separately 
or collectively in the corruption literature(Bardhan,1997; Treisman,2000; Jain,2001; Aidt,2003; 
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Lambdorff,2006; Billger & Goel,2009). A substantial bulk of research has shown that a politico-
economic approach stressing the importance of institutions is a powerful tool in understanding 
corruption(Abed  &  Gupta,2002;  Bradhan,1997;  Rose-Ackerman,1997).   Electoral  rules  and 
structures  substantially  affect  the  corruption  level(Kunicova  &  Rose-Ackeman,2005)  and 
countries tend to achieve an equilibrium position that is driven by the balance of political forces 
and institutions(Bird  et  al.,2006;  Bird  et  al.,2008).   Beyond  these  empirical  backings  in  the 
choice of government-quality control variables, the theoretical underpinnings of the corruption 
literature point to the central role of good-governance  in the fight against the scourge. In plainer 
terms,  the  choice  of  variables  is  fully  justified  by  theoretical  and  empirical  literature. 
Corresponding  summary  statistics(Appendix  1),  correlation  analysis(Appendix  2),  variable 
definitions(Appendix  3)  and  presentation  of  countries(Appendix  4)  are  detailed  in  the 
appendices. 
Beside  good-governance determinants,  borrowing from  Billger  &  Goel (2009,p.300), 
economic  prosperity  and  democracy  are  standard  determinants  of  corruption.  Economic 
prosperity  in  the  literature(Serra,2006)  is  observed  to  decrease  corruption  because  from 
common-sense  to  some  extent  economic  theory  bribe-takers  and  bribe-givers  are  lower  in 
wealthier nations, as the propensity to take bribe decreases when growth in national income is 
equitably distributed. Political competition entrenched in democracy is more likely to exert a 
positive effect on the fight against corruption  because elected officials are required to account 
for  policies  and are  sanctioned by the electorate  if  election  promises  are  not  kept.  A major 
election promise common to most African countries is the fight against corruption. Government 
quality  enshrined  in  regulation  quality,  rule  of  law,  government  effectiveness,  voice  & 
accountability and political stability(no violence) ensure greater economic and political freedoms 
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which  lead  to  less  corruption(Chowdhury,  2004;  Goel  &  Nelson,  2005).  The  size  of  the 
population is also likely to affect corruption, especially if demographic increase is accompanied 
with  a  higher  degree  of  urbanization(Billger  &  Goel,  2009).  A greater  concentration  of  the 
population in urban areas is likely to increase their discount rates and greater opportunities for 
interactions between potential bribe-takers and bribe-givers. Conversely, a highly concentrated 
urban population might indicate a greater chance of corruption-oversight (Billger & Goel, 2009). 
3.2 Methodology 
Borrowing from  Billger  &  Goel (2009), to determine if  existing levels of corruption-
control affect how various determinants in the battle against corruption come into play, we use 
quantile  regression.  This  technique  enables  us  to  investigate  if  the  relationship  between 
corruption-control  and  the  exogenous  variables  differ  throughout  the  distribution  of  the 
dependent variable(Keonker & Hallock, 2001). 
Previous  studies  on  the  determinants  of  corruption  are  based  on  Ordinary  Least 
Squares(OLS)  estimation,  which  report  parameter  estimates  at  the  conditional  mean  of 
corruption. While mean effects are certainly important, this study expands such findings using 
quantile regression. More so, one of the underlying assumptions of OLS regression is that the 
error term and the dependent variable are normally distributed.  However, quantile  regression 
does not require a normally distributed error term. Therefore, based on this technique we are able 
to carefully assess the determinants of corruption-control throughout the conditional distribution 
with particular emphasis on the best and worst fighters of corruption. Quantile regression(QR) 
yields parameters estimated at multiple points in the conditional distribution of the dependent 
variable(Koenker  &  Bassett,  1978)  and  has  gained  attention  in  recent  corruption 
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literature(Billger &  Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 2012). The  θ th quantile estimator of the 
dependent variable is obtained by solving for the following optimization problem.
{ } { }
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                                         (1)
Where θ ∈ ( 0 ,1). Contrary to OLS which is based on minimizing the sum of squared residuals, 
with QR we minimize the weighted sum of absolute deviations.  For instance the 10 th or 90th 
quantiles(with  θ =0.10  or  0.90  respectively) by  approximately  weighing  the  residuals.  The 
conditional quantile of iy given ix is :
θβθ iiy xxQ ′=)/(                                                                                      (2)
where unique slope parameters are estimated for each θ th quantile of interest. This formulation 
is analogous to βixxyE ′=)/( in the OLS slope though parameters are estimated only at the 
mean  of  the conditional  distribution  of  the  dependent  variable.  For  the  model  in  Eq.(2)  the 
dependent variable iy  is the corruption-control indicator while ix  contains a constant term, GDP 
growth, population growth, democracy, rule of law, regulation quality, voice & accountability,  
government  effectiveness  and  political  stability.  The  quantile  estimation  technique  is  more 
robust than the OLS approach in the presence of outliers when the distribution of the dependent  
variable is a highly non-normal pattern(Okada & Samreth,  2012).  We also report results for 
Least Absolute Deviations(LAD) which should correspond to those of the 0.5 th  quantile  for 
robustness purpose. 
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4. Empirical analysis
4.1 Empirical results 
The results presented in Table 2 include OLS, LAD and QR estimates. OLS estimates 
provide a baseline of mean effects  and we compare these to estimates of LAD and separate 
quantiles in the conditional distributions of the dependent variable. In the interpretation of the 
signs of estimated coefficients, note should be taken of the fact that smaller values(in conditional 
distributions) of the dependent variable denote less corruption-control.
In  the  OLS regressions,  greater  economic  prosperity  lowers  corruption-control  in  all 
cases.  This  finding  could  be  elucidated  from  two  perspectives:  (1)most  African  nations 
experiencing double-digit   growth  rates  are  in  the hands of  dictatorships(Angola,  Equatorial 
Guinea …etc) and less corruption-control is characteristic of authoritarian regimes; (2)economic 
prosperity  if  equitably  distributed  could  lead  to  a  decrease  in  subsistence-oriented 
corruption(activity and perceptions) and hence less imperative for corruption-control. Contrary 
to mainstream literature(Goel & Nelson, 2005; Serra, 2006), economic prosperity does move in 
tandem with greater political freedoms(democracy) that favor corruption-control.  Consistently 
across the five specifications; democracy, rule of law, regulation quality, voice & accountability, 
political  stability  and government  effectiveness  fuel  the fight  against  corruption.  But  for  the 
second  specification,  positive  demographic  changes  significantly  hinder  the  fight  against 
corruption.  This  could  be  the  result  of  increased  urbanization  owing to  rural  exodus.  More 
urbanized  nations  in  Africa,  other  things  being  equal  are  associated  with  less  effective 
government  oversight  and increased interactions  between bribe-takers and bribe-givers.  LAD 
regression results  are  broadly consistent  with  those of the 0.50th quantile  in the conditional 
distribution. 
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Table 2: Determinants of Corruption-Control: OLS, LAD and Quantile Regressions 
OLS LAD Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90
Specification 1
Constant -0.062 0.039 -0.024 0.030 0.039 0.058 0.128
(0.279) (0.352) (0.675) (0.490) (0.465) (0.496) (0.212)
Economic Prosperity -0.010*** -0.008** -0.0009 -0.001 -0.008** -0.012** -0.013**
(0.002) (0.023) (0.801) (0.637) (0.016) (0.018) (0.031)
Population growth -0.068*** -0.123*** -0.241*** -0.204*** -0.123*** -0.041 0.033
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.230) (0.420)
Democracy 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.025*** 0.031***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Regulation  Quality 0.618*** 0.689*** 0.660*** 0.682*** 0.689*** 0.652*** 0.650***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.660) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations  414 414 414 414 414 414 414
Specification 2
Constant -0.227*** 0.054 -1.126*** -0.592*** 0.054 0.062 0.304***
(0.000) (0.648) (0.000) (0.000) (0.475) (0.281) (0.000)
Economic Prosperity -0.005 -0.001 -0.009* 0.003 -0.001 -0.008** -0.000
(0.186) (0.818) (0.092) (0.543) (0.722) (0.022) (0.992)
Population growth -0.108*** -0.225*** 0.039 -0.108*** -0.225*** -0.109*** -0.048
(0.000) (0.000) (0.294) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.138)
Democracy 0.025*** 0.012** 0.023*** 0.026*** 0.012* 0.028*** 0.011
(0.000) (0.039) (0.005) (0.001) (0.066) (0.000) (0.120)
Political Stability 0.348*** 0.323*** 0.233*** 0.287*** 0.323*** 0.363*** 0.534***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 414 414 414 414 414 414 414
Specification 3
Constant -0.140*** -0.081*** -0.357*** -0.217*** -0.081* -0.023 0.183
(0.001) (0.196) (0.000) (0.000) (0.076) (0.694) (0.135)
Economic Prosperity -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.004* -0.007*** -0.012*** -0.015*** -0.021***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.091) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006)
Population growth 0.062*** 0.028 -0.004 -0.007 0.028 0.090*** 0.116**
(0.001) (0.399) (0.796) (0.723) (0.164) (0.000) (0.032)
Democracy 0.005 0.004 0.006* 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.012
(0.143) (0.256) (0.082) (0.239) (0.309) (0.216) (0.275)
Government Effectiveness 0.824*** 0.814*** 0.786*** 0.780*** 0.814*** 0.849*** 0.848***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 414 414 414 414 414 414 414
Specification 4
Constant -0.0007 -0.001 -0.364*** -0.210*** -0.001 0.286*** 0.369***
(0.987) (0.985) (0.000) (0.000) (0.973) (0.000) (0.000)
Economic Prosperity -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.002 -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.004
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.449) (0.001) (0.001) (0.234)
Population growth -0.015 -0.042 -0.071*** -0.067*** -0.042*** -0.006 0.046**
(0.388) (0.116) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.736) (0.047)
Democracy 0.002 0.004 0.019*** 0.011** 0.004 -0.008* -0.009*
(0.492) (0.331) (0.000) (0.011) (0.217) (0.067) (0.071)
Rule of Law  0.777*** 0.753*** 0.628*** 0.662*** 0.753*** 0.918*** 0.968***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 414 414 414 414 414 414 414
Specification 5
Constant 0.024 0.213*** -0.504*** -0.031 0.213*** 0.301*** 0.375***
(0.673) (0.001) (0.000) (0.652) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Economic Prosperity -0.004 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(0.205) (0.817) (0.705) (0.381) (0.633) (0.688) (0.642)
Population growth -0.113*** -0.217*** -0.085*** -0.205*** -0.217*** -0.144*** -0.038
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.306)
Political  Stability 0.258*** 0.198*** 0.071** 0.088*** 0.198*** 0.294*** 0.512***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Voice and Accountability 0.302*** 0.368*** 0.456*** 0.485*** 0.368*** 0.267*** 0.081
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.101)
Observations 414 414 414 414 414 414 414
Notes.  Dependent variable is the Control of Corruption index.  *,**,***, denote significance levels of  10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Lower 
quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where  the Control of Corruption is least. 
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Quantile regressions results reveal that the effect of economic prosperity(GDP growth) is 
consistent in sign(whether significant or not) across specifications and across quantiles. Greater 
economic prosperity leads to less corruption-control and the magnitude of the effect is  more 
important in countries where the fight against corruption is high. This implies that everything 
being constant, similar growth levels across countries will reduce  motivation  in the fight against 
corruption at higher quantiles: countries where  corruption-control is already high. In comparison 
with the findings from OLS, the sign of quantile estimates is consistent, with the magnitude of 
the effect of economic prosperity increasing  across quantiles(from the smallest to the highest).
But for specification 3, the effect of population growth is negative across quantiles and 
other specifications: consistent with the OLS estimates. However, the magnitude of the effect of 
positive demographic change does not reveal consistent results. While in specifications 2 and 5 
the  negative  magnitude  increases  from  the  0.10th to  the  0.50th quantiles  then  decreases 
subsequently, a corresponding general decrease in magnitude is observed for specifications 1 and 
4.  Thus in a combined interpretation of specifications, 1, 2, 4 and 5, within the top half of the  
conditional  distribution(among countries with more corruption control)  the negative effect  of 
population growth on the fight against corruption has lower magnitudes. 
The effect of democracy is almost always positive, confirming the position that political 
freedoms create conditions that monitor corrupt activities(Goel & Nelson, 2005; Serra, 2006). 
Corresponding  OLS  estimates  suggest  democracy  significantly  improves  the  fight  against 
corruption. The effect is supported by QR estimates, though not consistently across quantiles and 
specifications. But for results in specification 4, comparing only extreme distributions reveal that 
the fight against corruption increases with the democratization process. The magnitude is higher 
in countries that are already taking the fight against corruption very seriously. 
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Political  stability(specifications  2 & 5),  government  effectiveness(specification  3) and 
rule of law(specification 4)  QR estimates (consistent with OLS estimates) suggest that these 
aspects of good governance increase the fight against corruption. However the magnitude of the 
effect increases with ‘political will’ to fight corruption. It implies the effect is more witnessed in 
countries where there are already better institutions for corruption-control. Conversely,  ceteris 
paribus, the positive effect of voice & accountability on the fight against corruption(specification 
5) has a higher magnitude in lower quantiles; implying as voice & accountability is instituted in 
countries where the fight against corruption is less important, its effect on controlling corruption 
is  much higher  than  if  the same institutions  for  accountability  were established in  countries 
where the battle against corruption is already very important. In a nutshell, as the fight against 
corruption increases the relevance of voice and accountability in this fight decreases across the 
conditional distribution. Conversely, as the fight against corruption increases, political stability, 
government effectiveness and the rule of law become more relevant in the battle against bribery. 
4.2  Discussion, policy implications and limitations
  
The fight against corruption remains an important priority in policy making bodies in the 
African continent. In our findings, OLS estimates correspond(stricto sensu) at times to just a 
specific quantile of the conditional distribution. This difference suggests that some policies based 
on OLS should be reconsidered,  especially  across  the best  and worst  fighters  of corruption. 
Based on the findings, the following policy implications result.  (1) Regulation quality seems 
bimodal, with less positive effects in the tails: among the cleanest and dirtiest countries in the 
fight against corruption.  This implies policies to instill regulation in a bid to  battle corruption 
will  have  less  positive  effects  in  countries  experiencing  the  least  and most  effective  battles 
against corruption. Conversely, the effect will be more consequential  in countries falling within 
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the conditional distribution corresponding to the 0.5th quantile;  ceteris paribus. (2) Population 
growth remains an important concern in Africa today with the continent’s emergence as one with 
the highest  demographic  growth rates,  with the population  projected to  double by 2036 and 
represent 20% of the World by 2050(Asongu & Jingwa, 2011). This represents an important 
challenge  to  urbanization  with  an  obvious  potential   increase  in  ‘bribe-takers  bribe-givers’ 
interactions. Our results support a less negative consequence of population growth on countries 
that are already taking the fight against corruption seriously in comparison to those that are lax 
on  the  issue.  It  follows  that  African  governments  need  to  take  the  fight  against  corruption 
seriously  now to  mitigate  the  potential  effects  of  demographic  explosion  and  massive  rural 
exodus(increased urbanization). Strict reliance on OLS estimates would not have yielded these 
specificities. (3) Findings on democracy broadly indicate the democratization process increases 
the fight against corruption with a higher magnitude in the countries that are already taking the 
fight  seriously.   The  logical  conclusion  is  that  less  authoritarian  African  regimes  taking 
corruption-control  very  seriously  will  benefit  more  from  improving  democratization,  in 
comparison to more authoritarian regimes. (4) The relevance of voice and accountability in the 
fight  against  corruption  decreases  as  the corruption-control  is  taking more  seriously by the 
powers that be. It logically follows that this tool of government quality is more effective at the 
early  stages  of  the  fight  against  corruption  than  at  the  later  stages.  (5)  Good  governance 
dynamics  like  political  stability,  government  effectiveness  and  the  rule  of  law  gain  more 
importance in the fight against corruption when existing levels of corruption-control are already 
high.  (6)  Economic  prosperity  in  terms  of  GDP  growth  creates  unfavorable  conditions  for 
corruption-control with a greater magnitude at  the higher  quantiles( where the prevalence of 
corruption-control  is  already  very  important).  This  suggests  that  as  the  economy  booms, 
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countries  with  high  existing  levels  of  corruption-control  should  increase  their  vigilance  on 
corruption-control mechanisms(as there are higher temptations to abandoning the fight against 
corruption with economic prosperity). 
Our results show that blanket corruption-control policies are unlikely to succeed equally 
across countries with different political wills in the fight against corruption. Thus to be effective, 
corruption policies should be conditional on the prevailing levels of corruption-control as we 
have  elucidated  above.  To  be  effective,  corruption-control  initiatives  should  be  tailored 
differently across the  best and worst  corruption-fighting countries especially with respect to 
regulation quality, democracy, population growth and other good governance initiatives(political 
stability, government effectiveness, voice & accountability and rule of law). 
Common to all conditional corruption-control distribution strands is the issue of ‘political 
will’ in the implementation of reforms. Most African countries already have well established 
corruption control policies. However, their implementation and enforcement is another issue and 
remains a matter of political will. We shall outline some aspects that need to be accounted for if 
the  reforms  and  policies  we  have  suggested  are  to  yield  any  fruits.  (1)  The  fight  against 
corruption cannot  be a  ‘one man show’ and relegated uniquely to political  leadership.  Anti-
corruption strategies are effective if they are inclusive, systematic and structured; that is to say 
integrating all institutions and policies(investigation, prosecution research and prevention). Such 
institutionalization develops a forum of mutually reinforcing ‘horizontal accountability’ which 
inhibits reforms from being perceived as partisan issues or ‘witch hunts’. (2) Administrations 
could  establish  public  confidence  through  regular  updates   in  press  conferences  that  reveal 
strides  that  are  being  made  towards  reducing  wrongdoing,  increasing  accountability  and 
transparency.  (3) The independence of the anti-corruption body set-up by government is also 
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paramount for the success of reform strategies. In Hong-Kong and Singapore for instance, the 
effectiveness and success of anti-corruption institutions are directly related to their degree of 
autonomy. If the independent bodies are answerable to parliament rather than the head of state, 
this could improve their effectiveness. 
An important limitation worth taking into account is that studies of this kind depend to a 
great deal on the integrity of the proxy for corruption obtained from perception-based measures. 
Thus omitted variables and media-effect may significantly influence perceptions of corruption-
control. However, to the best of our knowledge there are no better indicators  of corruption-
control than those from African Development Indicators of the World Bank. 
5.Conclusion
Are there different determinants in the fight against corruption across African countries? 
Why  are  some  countries  more  effective  at  battling  corruption  than  others?  This  paper  has 
contributed  to  the  literature  on  the  determinants  of  corruption-control  by  focusing  on  the 
distribution of the dependent variable(the control of corruption). It is likely that the best and 
worst  countries in the corruption-battle  respond differently to factors that  influence the fight 
against corruption. There could be subtle institutional differences in corruption-control between 
dirty and clean nations that may affect corruption-control determinants and government efficacy 
in the fight against corruption. Our results suggest that the determinants of fighting corruption 
respond  differently  across  the  corruption-control  distribution.  This  implies  some  current 
corruption-control policies may be reconsidered, especially among the best and worst African 
nations in the battle  against  the scourge.  Results  could be summarized  in  the following.  (1) 
Greater economic prosperity leads to less corruption-control and the magnitude of the effect is 
more important in countries where the fight against corruption is high. (2) Regulation quality 
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seems bimodal,  with  less  positive  effects  in  the  tails:  among the best  and worst  fighters  of 
corruption.  (3)  There  is   support  for  a   less  negative  consequence  of  population  growth in 
countries that are already taking the fight against corruption seriously in comparison to those that 
are lax on the issue. (4) Findings on democracy broadly indicate the democratization process 
increases  the  fight  against  corruption with  a  higher  magnitude  on countries  that  are  already 
taking the fight  seriously.  (5) The relevance of voice and accountability in the fight against 
corruption decreases as  the corruption-control is taking more seriously by the powers that be. (6) 
Good governance dynamics like political stability, government effectiveness and the rule of law 
gain more  importance in the fight against corruption when existing levels of corruption-control 
are already high. 
In summary the rewards of institutional reforms are more positive in countries that are 
already  more  seriously  engaged  in  the  corruption  fight.  This  implies  there  is  a  reward  to 
‘experience’  in  the  battle  against  corruption,  meaning  laggard  countries  in  this  fight  will 
definitely benefit less in time when common policies are instituted by all countries. As a policy 
implication, the fight against corruption should not be postponed, doing so will only reduce the 
effectiveness of policies in the future. 
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics
Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Observations
Dependent Variable Control of Corruption -0.612 0.561 -1.694 1.086 414
Independent  Control 
Variables 
Economic  Prosperity 4.602 5.254 -31.30 37.99 414
Population Growth 2.262 0.815 -0.143 4.477 414
Democracy 2.903 3.896 -8.000 10.000 414
Regulation Quality -0.651 0.617 -2.394 0.905 414
Rule of Law -0.694 0.619 -1.913 1.053 414
Government Effectiveness -0.703 0.603 -1.774 0.807 414
Voice and Accountability -0.720 0.711 -2.174 0.947 414
Political Stability -0.541 0.860 -2.700 1.122 414
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. 
Appendix 2: Correlation Analysis 
CC RQ RL GE V& A PolS Demo GDPg Popg
1.000 0.753 0.867 0.865 0.628 0.648 0.452 -0.043 -0.292 CC
1.000 0.857 0.865 0.751 0.624 0.466 0.109 -0.224 RQ
1.000 0.907 0.700 0.756 0.510 0.063 -0.282 RL
1.000 0.699 0.644 0.483 0.036 -0.396 GE
1.000 0.582 0.750 0.050 -0.100 V& A
1.000 0.492 0.070 -0.194 PolS
1.000 0.073 -0.094 Demo
1.000 0.279 GDPg
1.000 Popg
CC: Control of Corruption. RQ: Regulation Quality. RL: Rule of Law. GE: Government Effectiveness.  V& A: Voice & Accountability. PolS: 
Political Stability. Demo: Democracy. GDPg: GDP Growth. Popg: Population Growth
  
Appendix 3: Variable Definitions
Variables Signs Variable Definitions Source
Control of Corruption CC Control of Corruption(estimate) World Bank(WDI)
Government Effectiveness GE Government Effectiveness(estimate) World Bank(WDI)
Political Stability/ No Violence PolS Political Stability/ No Violence (estimate) World Bank(WDI)
Regulation Quality R.Q Regulation Quality (estimate) World Bank(WDI)
Rule of Law R.L Rule of Law(estimate) World Bank(WDI)
Voice and Accountability V & A Voice and Accountability (estimate) World Bank(WDI)
Economic Prosperity GDPg GDP growth rate(annual %) World Bank(WDI)
Population growth Popg Average annual population growth rate World Bank(WDI)
Democracy Demo Level of Institutionalized Democracy World Bank(WDI)
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  
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Appendix 4: Presentation of Countries
Instruments Instrument Category Countries Num.
Legal-origins 
English Common-Law Botswana,  The  Gambia,  Ghana,  Kenya,  Lesotho,  Liberia, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, 
Swaziland,  Uganda, Zambia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe.
17
French Civil-Law  Algeria,  Angola,  Benin,  Burkina  Faso,  Burundi,  Cameroon, 
Central  African  Republic,  Chad,  Congo  Republic,  Congo 
Democratic  Republic,  Djibouti,  Egypt,  Eritrea,  Equatorial 
Guinea,  Ivory Coast,  Ethiopia,  Gabon, Guinea,  Guinea-Bissau, 
Libya,  Madagascar,  Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia.
29
Religions Christianity 
Angola, Benin ,Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Congo Republic, Congo  Democratic Republic, Ivory 
Coast,  Equatorial  Guinea,  Ethiopia,  Eritrea,  Gabon,  Ghana, 
Kenya,  Lesotho,  Liberia,  Madagascar,  Malawi,  Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, South Africa, Swaziland, Togo, 
Uganda, Zambia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe.
30
Islam Algeria,  Burkina  Faso,  Chad,  Djibouti,  The  Gambia,  Egypt, 
Guinea-Bissau,  Guinea,  Libya,   Mali,  Mauritania,  Morocco, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tunisia.
16
Income 
Levels
Low Income Benin ,Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Congo  Republic,  Congo   Democratic  Republic,  Djibouti, 
Ethiopia,  Eritrea,  The Gambia,  Ghana,  Guinea-Bissau,  Guinea, 
Kenya,  Liberia,  Madagascar,  Malawi,   Mali,  Mauritania, 
Mozambique,  Rwanda,   Sierra  Leone,  Togo,  Uganda,  Zambia, 
Tanzania, Zimbabwe.
28
Middle Income Algeria,  Angola  ,Botswana,  Cameroon,  Egypt,  Ivory  Coast, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Lesotho, Libya,  Mauritius, Morocco, 
Namibia, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tunisia.
18
Lower Middle Income Angola,  Cameroon,  Egypt,  Ivory  Coast,  Lesotho,  Morocco, 
Senegal, Sudan, Swaziland, Tunisia.
10
Upper Middle Income Algeria, Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Libya,  Mauritius, 
Namibia, South Africa. 
8
Num: number of countries 
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